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Mansfield (D., Montana)

July 8, 1954

GENEVA: FAILURE OF A POLICY

Mr. President: The war in Indochina appears on the verge of ending in

a truce.

The blood-letting of the past eight years will probably come to a close

very shortly.

There will be no more Dien Bien Phus, at least for the present.

The danger of armed involvement of American forces in Indochina, once so close,

has receded.

These are welcome by-products of the Geneva Conference.

little else.

There is

The situation in Korea, presumably the principal reason for our par-

ticipation in the conference, remains unchanged; thousands of American soldiers

are still committed there on the mainland of Asia.

With respect to Indochina, a serious defeat has been inflicted on

American diplomacy. And in the process vast new areas have been opened for

potential conquest by communist totalitarianism.

Last spring, in two speeches in the Senate, I expressed the

view that our consent to participate in the Geneva proceedings was a

mistake.

I did so because it was clear at the time that the communists
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would enter the conference, for all practical purposes, as a bloc; that the

communists, whether from the Soviet Union, l<orea, China or Indochina

would possess a singleness of outlook. It was not clear that the non-communist

nations shared any such unity of objective.

Indochina.

The British wanted to stay out of

The French wanted to get out of Indochina and for a

whil~

it

seemed that we were on the verge of getting into Indochina.

In these circumstances, how coul<l negotiations lead to anything but

failure for the non - communist powers?

These were the consequences which I felt might flow from a failure

at Geneva, as I stated them last April 14th on the floor of the Senate:

Patterns may be set which might influence the entire
political fabric of the French Republic and touch on every
aspect of Western European unity. Patterns may be set
which will determine whether aggression shall again
gather force on the shores of the South China seas to be
hurled at this nation from across the Pacific .

Certain of these r esults are already apparent .

The Geneva conference

has served to increase vastly the stature of the Chinese Communists in Asia

and throughout the world ,

Their influence now takes firm root in northe r n
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Indochina.

All the rest of southeast Ada lies before this totalitarian wave

which has spilled over the borders of south China.

The path of advance to

the west unfolds through small nations and points ultimately to India. South-

wards and eastwards, over the intervening islands of the Pacific, the path

stretches towards New Zealand, Australia and the Americas.

These grim prospects are not likely to materielize tomorrow or

next month. It may be years or decades before the full effects of the loss of

Indochina will be fully felt or understood.

Political waves are pulsating forces, not unlike those of the sea.

They change shape and form, and their power ebbs and flows as they move

through history.

This may be the case with the new totalitarian wave which has

flown out of China to the south.

It may undergo profound changes as it

moves outward. It may lose or gather momentum as it mixes with the

political cross currents of southeast Asia.

For the present, however, the unescapable fact is that totalitarianism
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and not freedom has emerged triumphant from the murky waters of the war of the
deltas .

Its triumph has been confirmed by Geneva and the pattern for a further

advance in the Far F.ast is set.
Nor are the consequences of Geneva confined to Asia and the Pacific
area.

Europe , too, will feel the impact of thio conference.

Until Geneva,

there was a chance that the great peoples of Western Europe would continue
to move their national heritages in the di r ection of a United Europe.
Thanks lo the co u rage , and the

wi~;dom

of a sincere American and a

great Sec r etary of State , Geo r ge C . Ma1·shall, and thanks to the financial
sac r ifices of the American people who bore the cost of the Marshall pl an
willingly and generously, Weste r n Europe had been able to lift itse!! out of
the mire of a disastrous war .

It had begun the long slow ascent towards unity .

It was on the verge of reaching the most elusive goal o! all , the !ormation

of a common Eur opean a r my .

Had this goal

bc~n

achieved France and

Germany woui.d have ceased to r evolve in age-old, separate and suici dal
orbits .

The int elligence , the skills , the strengths of these and other

gr eat nationo of Europe woul d no l onger have been pitted against each
othe r i n sensel ess destructive rivalry .

They would have been united for

mut:.1al benefit and fo r the benefit of the entire world .

This was a d r eam worth having and it was shar e d by great and
small alike in Europe and in America . It was the ho pe o f a century and it

- 5 stood on the very edge of achievement in the proposed creation of the

European Defense Community, the common European Army.

But now the

dream is ending; the hope is dimming,

These results were not expected when the Secretary of State, at

the Berlin Conference last February announced that this nation had been

committed to the Geneva meeting. I s ay this without reflecting on the

intentions or the capacities of the Decretary of State.

an able and devoted public servant,

The Secretary is

Some have even waxed lyrical in

their appreciation of his exceptional qualities. It has been said, for

example, that it is "wonderful" to have at last " a Secretary of State who

isn't taken in by the Communists, who stands up to them."

I cannot hope to match such eloquence in the expression of my re-

gard for the Secretary.

beyond doubt,

That he did stand up to the Communists, however, is

The Secretary refused to participate in the Geneva Conference

unless Mr, Molotov agreed that the Conference would in no way
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constitute American recognition of Communist China.

lie refused quite

correctly eve n to accept Mr. 1\:olotov•s word in this matter.

He insistccl

that Mr. Molotov sign a piece of paper making clear that the Geneva meeting

would in no way constitute reco3nition of Communist China.

Th~.;

Secretary

!ought Mr. Molotov day after day at Be1lin on this issue of the piece of paper.

And finally, because he had refused to be taken in by the CommuniGts, because

he had stood

up to them , the Secretary triumphed.

Mr. Molotov capitulated.

And in a climax worthy of the best of our curre11t telcvi:;ion dramas, Mr.

Molotov signed the piece of paper.

The Secretary is to be commcnued for not

b~inJ

taken in by the

Communists, for standing up to th<-m , for obtaining this piece of paper .

We still have the piece of paper in our archives, I presume and

meanwhile the Communists have obtained at Geneva all they set out to

acquire at Berlin a few months ago.
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The Secretary of State was hopeful of the possible results of

Geneva when he returned from Berlin to prepare for the conference.

"Berlin," the Secretary of State said on his return, "cleared the way

for other things to happen. 11

These were prophetic words.

Berlin cleared the way fo1· Geneva and a failure of American

policy.

At Geneva, international communism obtained by diplomacy what

it had failed up to then to obtain by threats, bluster, propaganda, intimi-

dation and aggression.

It obtained international stature for the Chinese Communist regime.

It obtained a firm and perhaps decisive foothold in southeast Asia.

It obtained the undermining of the cooperation of the free nations in

Europe and the West.

These are the visible consequences of Geneva.

them are others, still only dimly seen.

Beyond

The repercussions of the Geneva
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Confe r ence will echo throughout the world, in events in Germany, Japan,

France , North Africa and many other areas, in less-audible ways for

years to come .

Geneva was a mistake; and the result is a failure of American

policy.

It is a profoundly humiliating result.

I do not call attention to the mistake without an appreciation

o! the many difficulties which confronted the Secretary of State at

Berlin and Geneva .

enemies.

He had to deal with reluctant allies and obstinate

He had to stand in the forefront and seek to negotiate a

settlement :or peace while other s in this Administration oeat the drums

fo r war behind his back.

The job of the Sec r etar y of State is an extraordinarily difficult

one at

t.~is

time.

It is not made easier by those in high official

positions who, by offering public statements at inappropriate moments ,

in effect tell him how to run it.

Nor is the job made easier by those

-9who in contemplating his "wonderful 11 qualities . do so in a partisan framework

which tends to encourage disunity on foreign policy at a time when the Secretary

should have the widest possible support in Congress and the country.

Geneva is even now fast receding into history.

Before it disappears

and becomes a mere name, it is essential that we grasp the full implications

of this conference because it leaves behind, in dangerous disorder, the foreign

policy of the United States.

We cannot conceal this disturbing fact by a repetition of the cliches

of past years.

Even Yalta, which for so long has served as a substitute for

facing living realities, cannot be stretched and pulled far enough out of the dim

past to conceal the impact of Geneva.

The attempt to do so , if I may para·

phrase a lucid expression from the rich anthology o£ the distinguished and able

majority leader, the attempt to do so is like "trying to cover an elephant with

a donkey".
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Even a visit from the Prime Minister of Britain and the 1ssuance

of cordial joint statements cannot conceal the fact that the policy of the

United Stat cs has been gravely damaged by Geneva,

~

uch less can this fact be concealed by glib phrases.

dominoes are falling.

The cork in the bottle has popped.

game era off oreign policy is over.

The

The parlor-

Either we face this reality or we risk

the commission of other errors even graver than Geneva.

All that has been done at Geneva cannot be undone.

however, even at this late date, without resources.

We are not,

We can still have a

foreign policy that will keep this nation Gafe and free and at peace.

But

we can have it only if we recognize the errors that have been made and

act to correct them.

We can do nothing or wor se than nothing if we cling to the illusion

that television performances are a substitute for sound foreign policies;

-11that eleventh hour flights to foreign capitals are a substitute for carefully

culti "at ed, carefully maintained ccoperation with friendly nations; that

strong wo1·ds, even massive words, equate with a strong policy-- that they

take the place of genuine strength and conviction.

The Secretary of State used an eloquent phrase some time ago

when he spoke of an "agonizing reappraisal.

should go on continuously.

to fit the changes.

11

Reappraisals of foreign policy

The world changes and policies must be adjusted

There can be only one fixed constellation in the foreign

policy of the United States: the welfare of the nation under God; the preserva-

ti on of the f1·ee institutions which give us the promise of a meaningful

life.

Beneath this constellation, it is entirely proper and necessary

that reappraisals of foreign policy should go on continuously.

This is a

function which normally pertains to the executive branch of the government.

-12 -

If, however, the time has come for something extraordinary, for an

"agonizing reappraisal" then the Senate of the United States should

participate fully in it.

We have a sworn constitutional duty to do so.

Out of this body can come guides which may assist the President in

extricating our policies from the bog of confusion in which they now

flounder.

This

"agon~zing

reappraisal" of policy seems already to have

begun. In my opinion, it has begun on a note of irresponsible partisan-

ship.

A few weeks ago, the Postmaster ~General of the United States,

a member of the President's Cabinet, found time from his duties of de-

livering the mails to deliver some political remarks in Indiana on the

subject of foreign policy.

He began his reappraisal by going back a

decade or more in search of the causes of the loss of Indochina.

He

discovered these causes, like long-lost letters, in such places ao Yalta,

Teheran and Potsdam.

-13-

As I recall, there were res elutions introduced in Congress last

year to repudiate the Yalta and other wartime a greements.

The Administration,

only condcmnat ion of the violations;
however, has never sought repudiation/ nothing has ever come of these l'e:Jolu-

ti ons .

Unless the Administration has changed its position, unless it now

proposes to seek repudiation of these agreements, I cannot see any value in

beginning a reappraisal with them.

If we are to have a meaningful! review

of the situation in which we now find ourselves it can hardly start in the remote

past.

Much 1 es s can it begin with place-names like Yalta, Teheran and

Potsdam, pulled out of a mail-bag.

A few days ago, in a different vein, in a responsible vein, the

able majority leader raised the question of seating Communist China in the

United Nations.

He made clear his opposition to any such attempt with all

the vehemence and eloquence of which

b~

is capable.

I have the highest

regard for the sincerity and the consistency of the distinguished majority

leader and I can appreciate his sentiments in this matter.
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But with all due respect to the distinguished majority leader,

I do not believe that a reappraisal of policy ought to begin with an

event that has not happened.

The President has not indicated, so far as

I am aware, that he is about to change the policy pursued by the previous

administration, the policy of opposing the seating of Communist China in

the United Nations.

That policy has kept the Peking government of Communist

China from gaining a seat in the United Nations.

Does the President plan to change this policy? Is the

distinguished majority leader aw:l.re of such an intention? I! so, it

would be most helpful if he would enlighten the Senate on this matter.

It seems to me that this agonizing reappraisal, if it is to

be useful to the nation, can only begin, not in the past, not in the

future, but in the present.

To be sure, it may lead us step by step

to events in the past and it may point the way into the future.

We

live, however, not in the world of yeste:-day or the world of tomorrow,

but in the world of today. If we wish to survive in that wol"ld, we
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will do well to deal with its problems.

In the reo.lm of foreign policy, this

can only mean that the agonizing reappraisal should begin with the failux-e

of policy on Indochina and its implications.

We have got to find out what went wrong with this policy

o1· its administration and determine the ways to prevent a repetition of

the errors in the future.

lf we fail to do so, if we lose ourselves in the

past or the future, we shall go on collecting pieces of paper signed by the

Communists while they continue to fatten their influence throughout the

world.

I should like to address myself first to the role of the Senate

in the Indochinese situation.

So far as I am aware, the Senate cooperated

fully with the Administration from the very beginning of the gathering

crisis.

Not a single request in connection with Indochina was made by

the Administration which was denied by this body or, for that matter, by

the Congress.

- 16 The Administration did make requests.

It made repeated

requests for military and econoMic assistance to Indochina.

These

were all honored by the Senate, perhaps more liberally and more promptly

than they should have been.

In 1953 alone, over a billion dollars

in aid was provided fol' Indochina on the plea of the Administration

that such assistance was in the vital inte r ests of the United States .

It is true that some members of the Senate differed on one

point with the Administration.

United

~tales

in debate .

They would have preferred that the

av( id participation i n the Geneva proceedings and said so

Those of us who took this position -- and there were

a number of Senatot·s on both sides of the a i s l e -- were no t necessarily

opposed to negotiations as such.

Some of us were aware , however, that

the free nations were divided and confused on the issue of Indochina.

Before the United States parti cipated in

<l

conference with the cohesive

forces of communism, we wanted the division and the confusion eliminated

on our side .

- 17 -

In the light of what has happened was this preference unfounded?

Is it not true that in the end the Administration was forced to accept the

validity of this position? Did we not, for all practical purposes, abandon

the Conference long ago?

Could the terms of the settlement which is about

to be achieved have been any less favorable if we had not become involved

in the first place? On the contrary, there is reason to believe that the terms

are likely to be more unfavorable than they would otherwise have been, had

this country steered clear of the entir.e business .

The Senate, however, was not consulted on the decision to

participate in the Conference.

We were not, again to borrow a lucid expres-

sion from the distinguished majority leader, "in on the take-off" even though

all of us and the entire nation are inevitably "in on the crash landing. 11 Had

this body been properly consulted from the outset and not simply at the last

moment, it is possible that the error of participation might never have

occurred.

-l8As it wa s , the d e bate in the Senate which preceded the Gene va Con-

!erence may have helped to prevent a compo unding of the error.

It may hnve

helped to prevent what, in my opinion, would ha v e been a far more serious

•

mistake -- armed involvement of the United States in Indochina.

Just prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, it became

apparent that persons close to the Administration had !orzotten what the

President had said on February lOth.

On that date, he had told a conference of

newsmen that :

no o .1e could be more bitterly op}'OSed to ever gett:ng the
Uni t~tl States involved in. a hot war in that region (meaning
Indochina) than I am .

But a short time after, some of the leading figures in the Adminis-

tration began to act as though they had not heard the P1·esident. It fell to members

of the Senate lo inform them of what he had s aid.

As I recall, there were

many cross-currents of opinion in the debate that took place in the Senate prior

to the opening of the Gene'va Conference.

verged on one point:

Almo st all opinions, however, con -

The United States should no t become involved alone in a

shooting war in Indochina.
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Was this an errc neous position to take?

with it now?

Who would quarrel

Should the rncrnbers of the Senate have urged the Administra-

tion, instead, to add to the unsettled conflict in Korea still another in

Southeast Asia? Should the Senate have sat in silence while the Adminis-

tration stumbled into the war in Indochina? Into a war without p r eparation,

without popular support, without any concept of where it would take us o r where

it would end?

What would this nation have used to carry an invol vement in

Indochina to a decisive conclusi on, even assuming that it did not lead

to the atomi c holocaust of World War III? I have seen one estimate

which was published in U.S. News and World Report some weeks ago.

It

should be a reliable estimate since it is attributed to the Chief of staff of

the Army, General Matthew B . Ridgway .

In this estimate, it is calculated that to have won the war in

Indochina would have required 5 to 10 American combat divisions at the

outset.

More divisions had the F r ench reduced thei r forces o r had the

Chinese Communists entered the conflict in force.

•

-20Where would the se divisions hav e come from?

They were not avai 1-

able then nor are they a·.'ailable now. VIe have a "new look" in the a::.-med forces

but we do not have new divisions.

\\"e do not e ·.rcn have some of the old ones.

To have obtai ned the necessary manpower for use in Indochina would have m-

volvcd, according to the estimate I have just summarized, an increase in draft

calls from 25, 000 to 100,000 men per month.

And these men would have been

sent into a con!l ict for which even the French were not drafting men.

I do not know whether t 11e President himself ever seriously con-

si dered committing this nation to an armed involvement in Indochina.

Neverthe-

l ess, the air around him was full of military sound and fury just prior to Geneva.

There was much talk of involvement, even though Indochina would

have been in every sense "a nibbling war".

The terra.in of the Indochinese conflict--the flooded deltas , the

thousands of scattered vi llc:.tieS , the jungles - - is made to order for the "nibbling"

of mechanized forces.

The French have been nibbled and chewed for eight years.
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.. Nibbli:1g ware,

wars.

11

however, w-e

have been told are worse than atomic

Yet those who have laid down this principle carried this country to the

brink of engagement in the "nibbling war" in Indochina.

It may be that those who were seriously considering this course and

publicly hinting at its adoption, had not seen the terrain in Indochina.

Perhaps

they believed that the United States could have easily obtained a victory in

Indochina.

Perhaps they felt that Indochina was a bargain-rate war , that the

cost could be calculated, not in men's lives but in painless - sounding abstractions

like naval power and air power.

But surely they must remember what happened in

~<orea.

In Korea we

were able to bring to bear the massive retaliation of naval and air power in cir-

cumstances far more favorable than those that exist in Indochina.

after we have no victory in Korea .

Four years

We have a tenuous temporary truce .

Even this truce was not achieveJ with the painless-sounding

abstt·actions of naval and air power alone .

These played thei::.- part. but: the AnPm>

was convinceo of the (uti'..ity of bis aggression only after hundre ds of

-22thousands of A•nc r ic:\nR and othars had struggled back and forth in the mud, the

snow and the blood of a W<lr -battered land.

The truce ,llid not come until after a grueling bitter conflict.

It did

not come unti 1 thousands, in the air and on the sea as well as on the land, had

given their lives .

I do not say that the Administration should refrain from considering

the military aspects of any international crisis \'l'ith which we are confronted.

Such considerations are ab&olutely es scntial in a world from which war, un-

fortunately , has

"lOt

been banished.

The Administration, however , ought not

to pursue these considerations in public.

We ought to be spared the l udicrous

spectacle of this g r eat nation being led to the brink of war in public statements

and actions on one day and backed away from it the next.

bluster and retreat is designed to

If this diplomacy of

confuse the enemy , it succeeds only in con -

fusing the American people. This country has not achieved greatness under the

guidance of b l uffers , blusters, and buffoons.

We can 1 os e it if we cease to

say what we mean and mean what we say in foreign policy.

- 2.3 -

The Ser.ate, in debate on Indochina thought through soberly and fully

the implications of involvement in Indochina. I£ the debate helped to turn the Ad-

ministration from the ""urse of involvement which at least at one time in the

cri sis, it appeared bent upon, then the de!:>ate, in my opinion, was a useful one.

Had the Administration undertaken adequate, proper and timely

consultation with the Senate in this matter, it is entirely possible that a

consistent American policy could have been obtained before the Indochinese

situation reached the stage of crisis.

In my remarks of April 14th, however,

a few days before the opening of the Geneva Conference, I found it necessary

to call attention to the !act that

the administration has not yet seen fit to include the chairman and the ranking minority members of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its trust (on Indochina policy).

Other members of Congress wert: consulted shortly before that time,

but for some unexplained reascn these distineuished members were overlooked.

Several days later the error was rectified and subsequently consultation improved

markedly.

But by then, the damage had been done.

-24The Administration and presumably those who spoke !or it had already

scattered to tne four winds such diplomatic resources which we poeoeased to

deal with the situation.

They had spoken bold but futile

words.

The administra-

ti on had already staked our diplomacy on the hasty creation of an ill-conceived

alliance for sout beast Asia which refused to be born,

The nation, in short, had

already been gambled into an untenable position on Indochina.

'Nhen the \\'i th-

drawal hom this position came, it lert the VietNamese and French rcsi stance in

Indochina expooed and undercut and ready for the collapse.

The consequences were inevitable.

A French government which had

staked its life on military aid from this country to rescue Dien Bien Phu was

forced to resign.

The French began to draw in their forces in the northern delta.

Viet Namese nationalist troops supplied with weapons and equipment paid for by

the American people began to go over to the enemy in increasing numbers,

taking their equipment with them. The truce which is n.ow being negotiated is

only the last act in this tragic drama.

How did this sequence of events develop?

Why were the policies of

this nat ion gambled into virtual bankruptcy in Indochina?

There is a
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background to this tragedy and it began about a year ago in Indochina.

A year ago, the French devised a plan for a solution to the stalemated

war of the deltas.

This was the Navarre Plan. It was designed to eliminate the

com n 'lUnist threat i n Indochina and to insure the independence of the three

Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam.

The Navarre Plan involved certain changes in military strategy to

make possible offensive rather than defensive action against the communist-led

forces of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi-Minh. It involved a massive training and

equipment program for the local nationalist armed forces, notably those of Viet

Nam.

It involved a continued French military effort in Indochina until such time

as the local nationalists could themselves carry the burden of the conflict. It

involved vastly expanded military and other aid for Indochina from this country.

Beyond these essential elements, the key to the plan lay in the

political realm.

The key, upon which success or failure turned, was the

finalizing of the grant of independence from F rance to the three Indochinese

states.
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For years, the Frcr.ch who had gone a long way in granting

independence , hesitated to turn this key .

Last summer in conjunction

with the request fo r additional aid for Indochina , we were assured that

n•o 1ent of full independence was at hand ,

th~

If that had been the case, then the

Nava:cre plan offered p r ospects fo r a successful solution to the Indochinese

situation.

As I pointed out in a r epo r t to the Fo r eign Relations Committee

on my return from Indochina last fall , however , the plan could not succeed

unless all par ts were effectivel y carried out and , further, that lasting

success depended on sti ll anothe r facto r which had not at that time been

noted in offici a l statements .

It seemed to me that the nationalio t

governments of the thr ee Indochinese states and especially that of Viet

Nam had to put down firm roots in their own peoples ,

Only by so doing

could they expect to win away the acti ve support o r at least the benevolent

o r fea r ful neutr ality which at that time was held by the Communists

masquerading as nationalists .

• 27 -

The Navarre Plan failed.

It failed, not because the change in

military strategy which it involved was necessarily ill-conceived.

be~ause

the French shirked their military responsibilities.

Not

Not because

American aid was inadequate.

The Plan failed because the principal nationalist leadera of

Viet Nam were unable or unwilling to make the effort necessary to rally the

peoples of Indochina against the Communists.

It failed because the French were unable or unwilling to take

the decisive political steps which would have made the independence of

Viet Nam

dragg~c!

clear~ cut

and unequivocal. !nstead1 negotiations for this lJI!rpose

on interminably and the precious hours which were neeC.ed to gal -

vanize the struggle for independence slipped away.

These negotiations

began last year and by the time the Geneva Conference began, they were

still going on inconclusively.

I think it is of the greatest significance that in the truce which is now
their
being arranged Laos and Cambodia will probab!y manage to retain/independence

- 28 -

o von H·.oush t hoy ?o•••••od. ro l ~~ivoly

establishments in the area .

speaking, the smallest military

Viet Nam , whose defense forces numbered

seve r al hundred thousands and included skilled t r oops of the French Union

has passed partially into Communist control.

The answe r to this apparent

paradox may be found in part pe r haps , in the fact that the finalizing of the

i ndependence of Laos and Cambodia was no t delayed as in the ca::;e of Viet

Nam .

It may a l so be found, pe::.·lnps, in the fact that the r ulers of these two

count ries stayed i n thei r

ho~nelands

and l ed thei r people.

Certainly, eviuence that the nationalist l eaders in Viet Nam we r e

no t devel oping r oots i n the popul ace mus t have been vi sible months ago .

Certainly the f ailur e o f the F r ench to move decisively •o grant indnp.,.ndAro,p

to this state was evi dent months ago .

take to counte r these failu r es?

What action did the administration

Did officials in the

Administr:::~.tion

r eceive accurate r eports on developmcl'ts in the field?

Did they know

what was happening? If they did know , why was the r e no r eport to the

Sena te and the A:nerical' people on the t r ue situation? If they knew ,

- 29 how is it possible to account for the optimism that seemed to prevail

almo st until the las t hour b e fore the crisis? If they knew, h ow could the

Se cretary of Defense be quo t e d as late as February

wo uld think that a milit<.:t<y

,.~. r:tory

9~h

a J s uy:.a g

11

~

would be perhaps both possible and

probable. 11

If they knew that a failure was i m pending, as they sho uld have

known, why did responsible officials go on piling up m:.lita::y supplies and

equipm ent in the warehouses of Indochina?

Part of these supplies are now

going to the Communists by defection of troops or abandonment, and may

very well be turned against American forces at some time in the future.

The Navarre Plan , if I m ay reiterate, died not from military weak-

ne s s but fro m political causes. At no ti m e until the battle of Dien Bien Phu

did the French or the Viet Na m ese indicate in any way that the military

aid being supplied by this co t:ntry was inadequate .

I believe, even to the sending of a training

mis s ~ o n

They were opposed,

fro m this country.

-30At all times, at least until Dien Bien Phu, the France- Viet Nnmcse

forces far outnumbered the Viet Minh divisions.

The non-Communi s ts had

absolute control of the air and, by far, a superiority in naval craft and hca,•y

equipment.

In these circumstances how can the failure of the Navarre Plan be

attributed to anything other than political causes?

But in what fashion did the Aclministrati on react when it finally

realized that the Navarre Plan was failing? It reacted as though the causes

of the failure were rni litary.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the

Armed Forces on March 22d still insisted, in his words:

to win.

"The French are going

It ia a fight that is going to be finished with our help." This was a

military answer to a political problem.

At the same time, the Sect·etary of State set out to seek united action

in the form of the ill-dated Southeast Asia alliance.

This, too, hacl he been sue-

cessful, would have been a military answer to a political problem.

The nations which the Secretary tried to bring into the alliance were

the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, France, New Zealand, the t!nitecl I<'ingdom
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and the Indo-chinese states.

Had the alliance been established, its power

would have rested largely on non-Asian states. It was an ill-conceived

alliance.

It was based on the premise that the defense of A sian nations against

comlnunist tyranny rests in the first instance on the West.

That, in my

opinion, is a false premise. Asian freedom must be defended primarily by

Asians.

A people, whether in Asia or in the Americas, can preserve their

independence only it they have it in the first place and if they are willing to fight

to keep it.

Bey0nd this initial responsibility which ever y nation must accept,

nations can comhine among themselves for a joint defense of freedom .

If they

are threatened by aggressi on , singul arly or jointly, they can seek recourse

through the United Nations.

But from the beginning to the end of this process of

defense, the key factor is the determination of the peopl e of each nation to defend

their freedom.

This factor was l acking in the Secretary of State's eleventh hour

attempt to set up an alliance to save Indochina.

His attempt failed and the wreckage of American policy in Southeast

Asia now lies among the ruins of the war of the deltas.

We are confronted with

--32-the urgent necessity of raising up a new, a sounder, and more durable policy for

that area .

Southeast Asia today is no less important to the security and welfare

of free nations than it was a few month9 ago when the Secretary of State sai d :
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on
Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist
Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever
means would be a grave threat to the whole free community.

As long as the threat of totalit<::.rian ac;gression remains in southeast

Ania, the danger to the United States and other free nations will also remain.

The lo:; s of part of Indochina does not diminish this danger; it increases it.

But in remaining alert to the danger in Southeast Asia we cannot

ignore other areas of great importance to our security.

Southeast Asia is only

one front in the many-fronted struggle between freedom and tyranny. All of them

have a bearing on the security of the United States.

\ · c can use our strength

effectively in this many-sided conflict, only if we deploy it within this broad con-

text.

In determining policies for southea s t Asia, its relative significance must

be weighed against that of other fronts .
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The prin.ary dccisio.1s in such n1atters rest with the President.

It is his responsibility to reconstruct policies in Southeast Asia within

the world - wide framework, which will serve to safeguard the nation .

It seems to me , howeve r , that if such policies are to prove more durable

than tho:>e which haYe l:ee.1 pursued in the past , they need to be constructed

on certain principles.

These are principles which can be found in the

ft4ndamental values of our own society as well as in the values of an

awakened Asia .

I a11 led to make certain suggestions along these lines .

no originality in these suggestions .

I cl a i m

I am stating them only because I

believe there is a need to consider a cl ear - cut course of action to end

the weak, aimless drift and the futile expediency into which our foreign

policy for Southeast Asia appears to have slipped.

If we are to avoi d

precipitate action o r a blind retr eat in Asia , ei ther of which might be

disastrous, we must somehow re - establish guideposts to action i n that

area.
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I make the following suggestions without in any eense regarding them

as immutable.

I make them with a full awareness of their imperfections and

their inadequacies .

proved, but I

m~ko

I hope they will be challenged, debated, diocusacd and im-

them now in the hope that they may help to put up the guide-

po:>ts that are eo urgently needed .

1. Colonialism- - Chinese Commuaist or any other- -has

no place in Asia and the policies of the Uuitcd States

should in no way act to perpetuate it.

2 . The United States should look with favor on govern-

ments in Asia which are representati vc of their

people and responsive to their ncedll; but this

nation should not intervene in the internal affairs of

any peaceful country.

3, The defense of freedom in .A sia must rest in the

first instance on the will and determination of the

free peoples of that region.
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4.

Systems of alliances for the defense of free nations

in Asia against aggression must draw their primary

and preponderant strength from the Asian countries;

the a ssociation of the United States, if at all, with

such alliances should be indirect, through the machinery

of Anzus or similar combinations of non-Asian countries.

5.

The United Nations should serve as the only world-wide

marshalling center for resistance, in the event of

aggression or threat of aggression in Asia.

6.

The economic development of the nations of Asia is

preponderantly the responsibility of the peoples of

that region, to be pursued in accord with their individual

national genius and objectives; any assistance rendered by

this country, whether directly or through the United Nations

or other agencies, should be peripheral in scope and should

be rendered only when genuinely desired.
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The erection of cuidepo::.ts auch as these is only one requirement for

a policy that can succeed in Asia.

Tl is step will be futile unless the conduct

of our f<Jreign policy is restored to the dignity and orderliness which the people

of this country have a right to expect.

V!hat transpired in the weel·s of the gathering crisis before and during

the Geneva crisis came close to being a shameful spectacle.

The conduct of

policy in that period spread fear and uncertainty throughout this country and

seriously damaged the prestige of the United States abroad.

The time has come to put a stop to the multipl e voices which

apparently speak for the Administration on foreign policy. One part of the

Administration cannot indicate publicly that we are about to intervene in a war

and then another part suggest the opposite course on the following day.

The people of this country elected a President to conduct th..!ir foreign

policy, with the advice anu consent of the Senate.

authority if he so chooses.

The President can delegate his

But for the sake of the or 1 lcrly processes of govern-

ment, it ought to be clc:lr t"'' whom he has delegated it when he does so .
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Presumably the President has a Secretary of State to assist him in

matters of foreign policy. If that is the case, then the only official voices we

should hear in these matters ought to be the voice of the President and the voice

of the Sec retary of State. If that is not the case, then it would be most helpful if

the President would enlighten the nation as to whom and at what particular moment

others are speaking in the name of this country on foreign policy.

Before concluding my remarks today, I want to say only one thing

more.

The Geneva Conference, I believe may mark a major turning point in the

tide of world affairs.

We may well be entering a period of great change and flux.

The change is already suggested by the "agonizing reappraisal" which has begun

and which, before it is over may lead to agonizing readjustments.

In these cir-

cumstances, it seems to me that the temptation to assume an "all or nothing"

posture with respect to foreign policy is ever-present.

blame friendly nations for all that has gone wrong.

that they play the game our way or we will pick up

The tendency will be to

We will be tempted to insist

o~r

marbles and go home.
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I! this attitude prevails , i! it is the dcci sivc one, I believe we

will end up, not with "all" but with "nothing" .

The tremendous economic

sacrifices which the peot l e of this nation have made in the lavt decade will

have been made in vain.

The lives that were given in World War II and in

l<orca to construct a n1ore orderl y and decent world wi 11 have been given in

Y~B in.

If we choose the course of all or nothing, we may perhap s secure a

few years respite from the international r esponsibil ities which we have been

carrying .

Then, the world will once again close in on us .

We will end up with

nothing, nothing but our own bitterness . It has happened before.

We need not choose this course.

There is another open to us .

If

the present reappraisa l is conducted with r ecognition not only of immediate in-

tcrests, immediate passions , but also with a sense of responsibility to the genera·

ti ons of Americans that will come after us,. then I believe

w.;:.

s!1all take this other

course . I believe we shall find much wort!l preserving in what has been done in

the last decade, much that can be built. upon.

will we settle for "not!1ing".

We will not obtain "all" but neither

- 39 The choice is ours to make.

Ultimately, it is a choice between

shouldering day-4n and day-out a part of the responsibility -- however, burden-

some and irritating -- of maintaining freedo m in a world from which tyranny

has not yet been banished; or of abandoning this responsibility today only to have

to pick up tomorrow the crushing burden of a third world war.

